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INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT
TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A PROPOSED LOAN TO
THE MEDIUM INDUSTRY BANK
1. I submit the following report and recommendation on a proposed
loan in an amount in various currencies equivalent to $30.0 million to the
Medium Industry Bank (MIB) to be guaranteed by the Republic of Korea. In-
terest on the loan would be at 8-1/2 percent per annum. The loan would be
repaid in conformity with a schedule based on the aggregate of the amorti-
zation schedules of MIB's sub-loans, and would have a maximum repayment
period of 18 years, including three years of grace.
PART I - THE ECONOMY
2. The latest Economic Report ("Current Economic Position
and Prospects of the Republic of Korea") was distributed under cover
of SecM75-437 dated June 9, 1975. The Country Data Sheets are attached
as Annex I. An Industrial Sector Mission report is under prepara-
tion.
3. Korea's economic performance over the last decade has been out-
standing. It entered the sixties with one of the lowest income levels in
the world; it had little experience of participation in international trade;
and it lacked natural resources. Despite these unpromising beginnings,
Korea embarked on a course of export-oriented industrial growth that has
led to its recognition as one of the most successful examples of develop-
ment. Its rich endowment with the human capabilities for economic success,
the availability of considerable entrepreneurial talent, a social environ-
ment which is conducive to rapid economic change, and a national dedica-
tion to unambiguous economic goals, all contributed to Korea's impressive
performance. In the period 1964-74, the GNP growth rate averaged 10 percent
a year in real terms, reaching the record level of 16.5 percent in 1973.
This, together with a decline in population growth (from about 2.7 percent
per year at the beginning of the period to 1.7 percent at present), caused
per capita income to more than double in the period. The mainspring of
economic growth has been the increase of exports of manufactures (from about
$65 million in 1964 to over $4 billion in 1974). The ratio of exports to
GNP rose rapidly from 4 percent in 1964 to 27 percent in 1974, and the
manufacturing sector as a proportion of GNP increased from 12 percent to
28 percent in the same period. Agriculture, despite an annual growth rate
of about 3.5 percent during the last decade, declined as a proportion of
GNP (from 43 percent in 1964 to 23 percent in 1974).
4. Total real investment grew ten-fold between 1964 and 1974, and
the ratio of investment to GNP rose from 13 percent to 29 percent. External
resource requirements also grew rapidly, averaging about 9 percent of GNP
during 1970-71, roughly the same level as in the early 1960's. The marginal
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saving rate during the last decade was 30 percent, which indicates that large
capital inflows did not weaken efforts to mobilize resources domestically.
However, Korea entered upon a period of rapid growth with a very low level
of domestic savings and, therefore, the Government pursued a policy of rela-
tively heavy dependence on external capital in the interest of a rapid ac-
celeration of investment and growth. Moreover, since exports during 1964-74
were rising at an average rate of nearly 47 percent, the burden of additional
external debt was not excessive, and the debt service ratio stood at around
13 percent in 1974.
5. Korea's performance in attempting to achieve a balanced distribution
of the benefits of growth is also creditable. However, despite the fact that
income distribution in Korea is generally more equitable than in comparable
developing countries, the absolute gap in incomes between the urban and rural
areas widened during the 1960's despite substantial migration to the cities,
a modest reduction in the farm population, and high yields per unit of land
under cultivation. Growth of labor productivity in agriculture was neverthe-
less considerably slower than in manufacturing. Since 1967, the Government
has attempted to raise farm incomes and to provide other incentives for
increasing foodgrain production through a price support system covering rice
and barley. It broadened its efforts to achieve more widely and evenly dis-
tributed income growth by pursuing policies of decentralizing industry and
emphasizing investment in the less developed regions. Also, in 1971, the
Government initiated the Sae Maeul (New Community) Movement as a nationwide
self-help program, aimed at increasing productivity and incomes (especially
in the rural areas where nearly half the population still lives) and at
improving the quality of rural life. Partly as a result of these various
measures, average rural household incomes are now nearly in line with those
of average urban households.
Recent Trends
6. During the last three years the Korean economic situation has
been subject to sudden and sharp changes. Beginning with the latter part
of 1972, the Korean economy experienced an unprecedented boom. 1973 was an
exceptional year, even by Korean standards, and set new records of growth
in GNP, exports and savings. In the latter part of 1973, Korean economic
aspirations were expressed in terms of official targets for the early 1980's
of $1,000 per capita GNP and $10 billion of exports. The long-term strategy
implied the continuation over the next decade of an overall rate of GNP
growth of about 10 percent per annum but with reduced dependence, in rela-
tive terms, on net inflows from abroad.
7. The favorable economic developments of 1973 were interrupted by
external developments in 1974. The sharp rise in the price of petroleum
beginning in late 1973, the recession in Korea's principal export
markets, Japan and the U.S., in 1974, and the high level of foodgrain
and other import prices, combined to bring about a major change in the
short-term economic position of Korea. With its heavy dependence on foreign
trade, Korea was inevitably severely affected by these international devel-
opments.
8. The higher costs of energy and food imports alone placed a severe
burden on the economy and the balance of payments. Korean dependence on
imported fuels is not only extremely heavy but also, because it is very closely
linked to essential industrial and transport uses, cannot be readily reduced.
The additional cost of petroleum added almost $800 million to the import
bill in 1974 (considerably more than twice the current account deficit in
1973) and a doubling of the prices of foodgrains increased foreign exchange
requirements in 1974 by more than $300 million, despite a decline in the
volume of these imports. Together, the increase in the costs of petroleum
and foodgrains accounted for about 45 percent of Korea's increased import
bill in 1974 and for 25 percent of total import payments. The cost of
imported raw materials and intermediate goods also increased appreciably
and compounded the balance of payments problem. The magnitude of the effects
of these adverse developments can be gauged bv the fact that Korea's terms
of trade deteriorated by 18 percent, or about 5 percent of GNP, in 1974
compared with 1973.
9. This terms of trade loss combined with a simultaneous setback to
export growth resulted in an appreciable slowdown of the economy in 1974.
Real export growth, which had reached a peak of 52 percent per annum during
1972-73, was only 9 percent in 1974; this was attributable primarily to the
deep recession in the U.S. and Japan. The volume of Korea's exports to
Japan declined by about 6 percent during 1974 and its trade deficit with
Japan widened to $1.2 billion compared to $0.5 billion in 1973. The volume
of exports to the U.S. increased even in 1974. It is noteworthy that
Korean exports to countries other than the U.S. and Japan showed a marked
increase during 1974 denoting considerable initial success of the inten-
sifying market diversification efforts. Although exports have revived
somewhat in 1975, they are estimated to increase by only 14 percent during
the year as compared with an average of 36 percent during the 1970-74 period.
10. Imported inflation has also led to a very sharp upward pressure on
the domestic price level. In addition to the sharply higher prices of
imported petroleum and foodgrains, the average unit value of other imports
increased by 45 percent during 1974. Consequently, the rate of domestic
inflation accelerated; in calendar year 1974, consumer prices rose by about
26 percent and wholesale prices increased by about 45 percent. Since the
middle of 1974, the rate of domestic inflation has slowed somewhat, reflect-
ing seasonal factors, the slower increase in the prices of imported goods
and the dampening effects of rising inventories of manufactured goods.
Government Policy Response
11. Until the end of 1974, the Government followed policies which were
based on the premise that worldwide economic recovery would commence by
early 1975. Thus, the principal objectives of policy in 1974 were to ease
the adjustment to higher oil and other import prices, and to avoid the
slowing of domestic investment and employment growth.
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12. In general, the Government has accepte(d necessarv price adjustments
arising from lhigher energy and other import costs; one major exception to
this general policy was its unwillingness to place on consumers the full
burden of higher import costs of basic foodstuffs. Thus, although prices
paid bv consumers for foodgrains increased, substantial subsidies are involved
in the sale of wheat and rice. Complete avoidance of subsidies at a time of
growing unemployment and declining real wages in manufacturing would have been
difficult. The Government is greatly concerned with the heavy burden these
subsidies have placed on the budget and their reduction is a major objective
of the Government.
13. Selective credit measures to assist the most distressed industries
were another element in the Government's effort to cushion the impact of
recession in 1974. These measures were intended to enable industry to
finance stocks of specified raw materials, and to carry raw materials and
finished goods inventories that had become excessive as a result of the
decline in export demand. Small- and medium-sized firms which were particu-
larly hard hit by the onset of the recession were assisted by a large credit
program embracing both working capital and investment loans. These firms
also benefitted from a preferential (government subsidized) interest rate of
12 percent, 3 percent below the normal bank rate on such loans. Similarly,
special subsidized credit facilities were made available to the machinery
industries and to finance equipment purchases by export industries. All
told, such programs provided credits totalling some W 200 billion ($495
million), equivalent to over 20 percent of the increase in total credit to
the private sector in 1974. Overall monetary policy, which had been made
quite tight in the first half of 1974, was significantly eased after
mid-year. The increase in domestic credit in the second half of last year
was more than double that in the January-June period and, over the year as
a whole, domestic credit expanded by about 50 percent compared with an in-
crease of only about 30 percent in 1973. However, owing to the contraction-
ary influence of the external deficit, the money supply increased by only
about 30 percent, compared with 40 percent in 1973.
14. In December 1974, the Government introduced a further set of
special measures to offset the sluggish demand for exports and to relieve
the liquidity problems of exporters. It expanded the program of export
financing, undertook to purchase excess inventories of finished goods from
industries particularly hard hit by the fall in export demand, and increased
credits to exporters for the purchase of imported and domestic materials.
On December 7, 1974, the currency was devalued by 17.5 percent to W 485 per
U.S. dollar. The devaluation was not expected to increase exports appreciably
because of the depressed state of Korea's overseas markets, but like some of
the other measures, it was intended to improve the liquidity position of
manufacturing enterprises. It should also improve the competitive position
of import substitution industries which had been weakened during the year.
But the devaluation has also contributed to continued inflationary pressures
in 1975. Among measures taken by the Government to help the low income
groups are substantial income tax relief, a 30 percent increase in salaries
of Government employees and the initiation of public works projects, mainly
in the urban areas, to alleviate unemployment. The rural areas appear to
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have been hit less hard by the economic slowdown. The terms of trade moved
further in favor of the farmers during 1974 as the support price for rice
was adjusted sharply upward.
15. It was largely because of the efforts to sustain the 1973 momentum
of growth that the real GNP rose in 1974 by more than 8 percent; sizeable
gains were recorded in both consumption and investment. However, notwith-
standing the support provided by Government, there was a sharp slowdown in
industrial output, private fixed investment and export sales in the second
half of 1974.
16. The impact of the adverse turn of events in 1974 was borne primari-
ly by the balance of payments. The current account deficit widened from $0.3
billion in 1973 to $1.8 billion in 1974 and may be somewhat larger in 1975.
Even this expectation assumes a substantial improvement in the latter half
of this year, since the current account deficit in the first four months of
1975 alone amounted to $1.2 billion; however, by July there were signs that
import and export trends were coming into better balance. The financing of
the 1974 deficit involved a very large reduction ($738 million) in net
international reserves (to $300 million); so far this year the continued
deficit has meant further reduction in net international reserves.
The financing of the large anticipated balance of payments deficit for
1975 will require a major increase in disbursements of medium- and long-
term loans.
Longer-Term Prospects
17. Before the international developments of late 1973 and 1974, Korea
appeared to be set on an economic course which could have led to its exceed-
ing its long-range economic goals. However, the changes since the long-term
framework was formulated in 1973 have necessitated a re-examination of both
the objectives and the strategy. Although revised plans have not been
completed, it appears that the target for the average annual increase in
GNP will be lowered to 8 percent, and that the pattern of future growth
will be somewhat different from that originally envisioned. Nevertheless,
industrial development will remain an important element of the long-term
strategy. Greater emphasis is also being given to increasing agricultural
production and rural incomes. The preparation of the Fourth Plan (1977-81)
affords an opportunity for a careful reconsideration of stragegy; the Govern-
ment has been extended financial assistance by the UNDP to meet the cost of
consultants (and fellowships for Korean staff) to assist with the preparation
of the Plan during the next 12 months, and the Bank is acting as Executing
Agency.
18. Korea will in all probability be capable of sustaining an annual
growth rate of GNP of 8 percent during the next decade, provided the large
external capital inflows required to meet the sizeable balance of payments
deficits are available on reasonable terms. Considering that 90 percent of
Korea's exports now consist of manufactured goods, that its links with the
Japanese economy remain strong, that vigorous efforts are being made to
- 6 -
penetrate new markets (especially in Europe and the Middle East) and that
some progress has already been made in diversifying the industrial structure,
a long-term real growth rate of exports of at least 12 percent appears possi-
ble even if world trade in manufactures should expand at a much slower rate.
However, this would represent a substantially slower export growth than in
the past, and Korean plans already envisage greater emphasis on import
substitution in three key areas (a) foodgrains, (b) energy and (c) machinery
production, all of which will probably mean sharply higher investment costs
per unit of output.
19. The Government is aware of the need for careful monetary and fiscal
management in the months ahead. The ability to contain the balance of pay-
ments deficits will depend partly on the speed of the recovery of exports
and partly on the Government's determination to narrow the fiscal deficit
and to reduce the rate of domestic credit creation. However, substantial
reduction in the current account deficit is likely to take several years
unless the upturn in the U.S., Japanese and other OECD economies is very
sharp in the years after 1975. Finding the means to finance the external
deficits will continue to be Korea's most urgent economic challenge. The
servicing of the sizeable foreign borrowing required should not pose serious
difficulties for Korea given the present debt service ratio and the long-
term prospects for continued export growth, provided that the proportion
of debt incurred on short- and medium-terms and at high interest rates is
not excessive. The debt service ratio stood at about 13 percent at the end
of 1974. It is expected to rise moderately to around 16 percent by 1980
and decline to less than 15 percent by the mid-1980's.
PART II - BANK GROUP OPERATIONS
20. As of September 30, 1975, Korea had received 21 Bank Loans and
8 IDA Credits, amounting in total to $854.7 million in loans and $107.0
million in credits (taking into account cancellations and the refinancing
of one IDA Credit in a subsequent Bank loan).
21. Nearly one-half of the total has been for the transport sector --
$219.7 million for railways, $101.5 million for highways and $80 million for
ports. $130.5 million has been lent for agriculture projects. The Korea
Development Finance Corporation (KDFC) has received $150 million and the
Korea Development Bank (KDB) $60 million in Bank loans for relending to
private industry. A program loan of $100 million was made for the financing
of urgently required imports of capital and intermediate goods. A total
of $80.3 million has been provided for three education projects; $25.0
million for a tourism project; and $15.0 million for a secondary cities
project.
22. Excluding one project that was subsequently cancelled, IFC had, by
September 30, 1975, entered into nine commitments: five in the financial sector
and one each in the fields of textiles, electrical and electronic products,
synthetic fibers and tourism, totalling $30.5 million (net of participations
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and cancellations). Currently, IFC has under advanced consideration a
zinc smelting project and a project involving the leasing of industrial
equipment; under preliminary consideration are projects in the fields of
steel products, cement distribution, electric motors, bearings, and tire
manufacturing.
23. Korea's ambitious industrial development programs require large
capital expenditures in the private sector, a situation which enhances the
need for IFC presence. With the closer relationship established as a re-
sult of recent promotional efforts, we expect IFC's activities to continue
expanding rapidly. IFC would seek projects that would: (i) result in for-
eign exchange revenues or savings; (ii) contribute to modernize or deepen
the industrial structure; and (iii) increase value added in manufacturing.
24. As of September 30, 1975 about $519 million of the total Bank lending
remained undisbursed on effective Loans and Credits. The rate of disburse-
ments has increased in recent months. Annex II contains a summary statement
of Bank Loans, IDA Credits, and IFC Investments as of that date and Notes
on the execution of ongoing projects. As indicated in the Notes, progress
on project implementation is generally satisfactory, although difficulties
have been encountered with some projects and most seriously with the
Pyongtaek-Kumgang and Yong San Gang Irrigation Projects (Loan 600 and
Loan 795/Credit 283, respectively).
25. The emphasis which the Government places on agricultural and
rural development will be reflected in the-programs for FY76 and 77. A
Second Integrated Dairy Development Project was approved recently; in
addition, a rural infrastructure project has just been appraised and the
Miho and Naeseong Cheon area development project pre-appraised. A second
stage of the Yong San Gang Irrigation Project and the Okseo Irrigation
and regional development project have already been identified and are under
preparation. Follow-on projects in agricultural credit and agricultural
products processing are also under consideration.
26. The further development of the industrial and agricultural sectors
and the anticipated growth of exports will require concurrent infrastructural
development. Although the transport sector will be given relatively less
emphasis than in the past, the investments required are large, and thus
there is considerable support for this sector in the proposed program.
27. The Government is intensifying its efforts to prepare projects
suitable for external official financing in the fields of infrastructure,
agriculture and regional development. The foreign exchange component of
such projects is low, partly because they consist largely of civil works,
and Korea's construction industry is efficient and well organized and wins
an overwhelming proportion of contracts put out to international competi-
tion; its dependence on imports is expected to lessen in the future. More-
over, the country's capacity to meet its requirements of machinery and
equipment from domestic sources is also increasing. Korea's need for of-
ficial aid therefore cannot be met if financing is confined to the foreign
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exchange costs of projects.. For this reason the Bank should continue to
be prepared to finance, in appropriate cases, a portion of local costs.
28. The share of the Bank Group in Korea's total external debt (dis-
bursed) outstanding at the end of 1974 was about 6.0 percent, and the share
of debt service was of the order of 2.4 percent at that time. These ratios
are expected to increase somewhat by the end of the present decade.
PART III - THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR AND INDUSTRIAL FINANCING
Industry and its Financing
29. The industrialization strategy followed by Korea over the last
decade was based on a recognition of the limitations placed on it by the
country's relative lack of natural resources. Planning for the develop-
ment of industry centered around the aim of expanding the export of manu-
factures rather than on concentrating principally on import-substitition.
An important ingredient in the success of this policy was the fact that
formal education in Korea had by the 1960's reached a level comparable with
that of countries with considerably higher income levels. This gave Korea
the advantages of a skilled and adaptable labor force as well as the ability
to quickly develop efficient managerial talent. Furthermore, Korea adopted
a policy of developing labor-intensive industries such as textiles, clothing,
electronics and plywood, whose capital requirements are modest. In this
respect, it is noteworthy that the expansion of Korea's industrial structure
in recent years (1970-74) absorbed only 23 percent of total fixed investment,
and that value added per worker increased by about 10 percent per annum over
the last decade, reaching about $2,000 in 1974. The extent to which the
Korean economy depended on its light industry can also be gauged from the
fact that in 1972 it accounted for nearly 90 percent of the exports of the
manufacturing sector and about 80 percent of the value of total merchandise
exports.
30. This export-oriented strategy served Korea well in a period of
continuous growth of the world economy but it has also made Korean industry
vulnerable in a time of recession. Korea's industrial plans in recent years
have, therefore, been aimed at diversifying the economy and developing more
integrated industries. Since 1970, over half of the total industrial
investment has been allocated to the chemical, petroleum and basic
metal industries to ensure the supply of inputs at stable prices. The
establishment of Korea's first integrated steel plant at Pohang (currently
being expanded from 1 million to 2.6 million tons), the large shipyard at
Ulsan, and the naphtha cracking plant and related operations at the Ulsan
oil refining complex, marked the first steps in the deepening of the indus-
trial structure.
31. Nlotwithstanding the further changes in Korea's plans that are
likely to result from the re-examination of its industrial strategy, it is
apparent that the re-structuring and expansion of Korea's industrial sector
will require a heavy outlay of capital. The Government has embarked on a
major effort to mobilize the funds required. A 1Eational Investment Fund
(NIF) was established in December 1973; it is expected to finance a size-
able proportion of the investment needs of Korea's major industries by the
early 1980's. The Minister of Finance is in charge of the Fund, but in
effect delegates its management and operation to the Governor of the Bank
of Korea. The resources of the Fund will be mobilized mainly by issuance
of NIF-Bonds (which are purchased by banks, savings institutions and cer-
tain pension and trust funds) and the remainder by direct subscription by
the Government. The funds will be onlent through the banking system and
development finance companies for investments in fixed assets (about two-
thirds) and for working capital needs (one-third) of major industries.
32. The timely provision of long-term finance for the key industries
will depend to a large extent on the efficient operation of the NIF and the
tapping of other sources of funds such as Korea's three major development fi-
nance companies - KDFC, KDB, and MIB. These three institutions were respon-
sible for 64 percent of total medium- and long-term loans in Korea in 1973.
The proposed loan would be the Bank's first to MIB. A fifth loan to KDFC
was made in July this year and the first to KDE, which is the largest finan-
cial intermediary in Korea, in March. The magnitude of the demand for term
finance in Korea is such that these three institutions, even if their oper-
ations increase significantly, will continue to act in a complementary rather
than a competitive manner.
33. There is a clear 'de facto' demarcation of functions between MIB,
and the other Korean institutions providing term finance for industry. The
MIB Act explicitly confines its financing to "small and medium scale enter-
prises". Such enterprises are defined in the Act as those which either have
less than 200 employees or total assets with specific limits as determined
from time to time. At present the assets limit is set by the Government at
W 50 million (this limit is being increased to W 300 million) for MIB's
domestic currency lending and at W 600 million for its foreign currency
lending. MIB intends to use the proceeds of the Bank loan for enterprises
with total assets below W 600 million.
Small and Medium Scale Industries (SMI)
34. Small- and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises have made a
significant contribution to the successful transformation of Korea's slug-
gish agricultural economy of the 1950's into one of dynamic growth, based
on increasing industrialization. Although, as indicated in paragraph 30
above, there has been an increasing amount of industrial investment in the
chemical, petroleum and basic metal industries since 1970, investment in
S>MI has also grown. As a result, it retains a prominent position in the
country's economic profile as evidenced by its exports in 1974 of $1,640
million or 36 percent of Korea's total merchandise exports, its share of
45.3 percent of total industrial employment, and 27.9 percent of industrial
value added.
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35. In view of the important role that SMI has to play in the moderni-
zation and expansion of the manufacturing sector, the Government has ensured
that it has a strong institutional base. The Small Industry Bureau (SIB)
of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry performs an important regulatory
function in formulating, coordinating and implementing policies in the SMI
sector. In addition, the National Federation of Medium Industry Cooperatives
provides its 158 member SMI Cooperatives throughout the country with such
services as the coordination of business activities, maintenance of quality
standards, assistance in arranging credit, technical and marketing assis-
tance and guidance, and sponsorship of industrial estates.
36. The three main sources of finance for SMI are: (a) the MIB, which
provides both short-term won credits and long-term loans in domestic and
foreign currencies; (b) the Citizens National Bank (CNB), which provides
loans of up to W 10 million ($20,619) to small enterprises with less than
50 employees and cottage industries; and (c) the fifteen commercial banks
in five of which the Government has a substantial shareholding. As of
December 31, 1974, MIB had provided about 20 percent of the outstanding loans
to SMI from these sources and CNB about 13 percent.
37. Government efforts to assist SMI have been intensified recently.
The measures adopted include: (a) the establishment of a Credit Guarantee
Fund, which provides guarantees to enable small enterprises with viable
investment projects but inadequate collateral to borrow from commercial
banks and financial institutions (the scheme is administered by the MIB);
(b) a statutory requirement that the commercial banks make at least 30 per-
cent of their loans to small and medium enterprises; (c) the establishment
of local industrial estates catering to small enterprises: and (d) a scheme
to encourage the development of small factories in rural areas as an integral
part of the "Sae Maeul" (New Community) Movement, with the objective of aug-
menting off-farm employment opportunities in these areas.
PART IV - THE PROJECT
38. A report entitled "Appraisal of the Medium Industry Bank" (No.
865-KO dated November 4, 1975) is being distributed separately. A Loan
and Project Summary is attached as Annex III. Negotiations were held in
Washington from October 13 to 17 with a Korean delegation led by Mr. Yong
Woon Kim, MIB's Deputy President.
The Company
39. MIB, a Government-owned institution, 1/ established in 1961, to
promote and assist Korean SMI, is by far the most important source of term
finance and technical assistance for this segment of the country's industrial
sector. Its financing comprises both long-term operations (e.g., loans and
guarantees in domestic and foreign currencies) and short-term commercial
banking operations (e.g., working capital loans, deposits, letters of credit,
etc.). Over the years, MIB has built up an efficient organization with good
standards of internal operation- it enjoys a high degree of operational
autonomy vis-a-vis the Government. MIB's importance can be gauged by the fact
that, at the end of 1974, it had 18,570 borrowers - almost 70 percent of the
total number of small and medium scale enterprises operating in Korea. Approxi-
mately 90 percent of MIB's financing has gone to the highly export-oriented
manufacturing sector.
40. In addition to being a significant source of tinance for Korean
SMI, MIB plays an important qualitative role. Its Extension Service Depart-
ment (ESL) has benefitted trom a staff training scheme which involved the
attachment of foreign advisors to it under a UNDP/1LO program which began
in 1967. As a result, ±SD has become an extremely important and effective
source of technical assistance and extension services for SMI firms in
Korea. MIB performs a variety of other developmental functions, including
the preparation of feasibility studies on specific SMI activities and the
conduct of professional seminars.
Management and Organization
41. MIB's activities and administration are governed by the Act under
which it was established in 1961. The Act, which has been successively
amended, sets out general policies and broad guidelines, supplemented in
more detail by Presidential Decrees. MIB is also subject to the General
Banking Act and the control of the Superintendent of Banks insofar as its
commercial banking activities are concerned. In addition, its operations
are guided by a Policy Statement (adopted in 1969) which outlines its oper-
ational and financial policies and procedures. The IMinister of Finance
exercises broad supervisory powers over MIB's general stragegy, policies,
budgeting and planning through his authority to approve: (a) MIB's annual
Operational Plan; (b) the Operating Manual which spells out MIB's opera-
tional and administrative procedures in some detail; (c) MIB's Annual Bud-
get; and (d) its annual accounts and the allocation of its profits. The
Ministry of Commerce and Industry exercises broad influence over MIB's
overall policies through its representation on its Board of Policy.
1/ Except for a very small percentage (about 0.5% of MIB's present paid-
in share capital) of shares originally owned by private shareholders
in the Korea Agriculture Bank, a part of whose assets and liabilities
were transferred to MIB at its inception. The MIB Act did not allow
private shareholders to participate in subsequent issues of its shares.
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42. At the apex of MIB's management structure are the Board of Policy
and a Board of Directors. The Board of Policy convenes about four times a
year, and has seven members including MIB's President (who acts as Chairman),
one representative each from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce
and Industry, the Bank of Korea, the National Federation of Medium Industry
Cooperatives, and two representatives of small entrepreneurs. Executive
authority is vested in the Board of Directors, which is also composed of
seven members including MIB's President (who acts as its Chairman), the
Deputy President and five Directors, each of whom is in charge of one or
more of its Departments. This arrangement provides an opportunity for key
Government officials and representatives of industry to contribute to the
deliberations of the Board of Policy, while also concentrating executive
authority in the Board of Directors, thereby helping MIB to maintain its
autonomy so far as operational matters are concerned.
43. The chief executive is MIB's President. Since March 1975, this
post has been occupied by Mr. Kim Woo-Keun, formerly a Governor of the
Korea Exchange Bank, who has extensive experience in banking and finance.
As of December 31, 1974, MIB's total staff numbered about 3,200; of these
approximately a quarter were professionals. About 30 percent of the staff
were assigned to the head office and the remainder to 60 branches and 15
deposit offices. MIB's staff is of good caliber. Staff training is thorough
and methodical. The work relating to the proposed Bank loan will be handled
mainly by MIB's Foreign Loan Department (FLD), a well managed, though pre-
sently understaffed, unit with 42 employees of whom 17 are professionals.
MIB's management plans to increase the Department's strength in 1975 and
1976, with a view to improving both its appraisal and follow-up capacity.
Operations and Resources
44. From its inception in 1961 to December 31, 1974, MIB made
financial commitments aggregating W 2,844 billion ($5.9 billion equivalent),
most of which was for short-term working capital loans. Its approvals of
term loan commitments to that date totalled W 85 billion ($175 million
equivalent). It began to make foreign currency loans in significant amounts
only in 1969, when substantial foreign exchange resources became available
to it as a result of the Asian Development Bank making its first loan to
MIB. As of December 31, 1974, of MIB's total outstanding loan portfolio of
W 157.8 billion ($325 million), W 109 billion ($225 million) or about two-
thirds represented working capital loans and the remaining W 49 billion
($100 million) equipment loans. Slightly more than one-half (by amount)
of MIB's equipment loans were made in foreign exchange. Apart from direct
lending, MIB also administers (without financial liability) on behalf of
the Government, the Credit Guarantee Fund (CGF). As of December 31, 1974,
the total of outstanding guarantees under the CGF was W 20.2 billion ($42
million), equivalent to about 15 percent of MIP's own outstanding loan
portfolio.
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45. MIB provides a full range of commercial banking services to SMI.
These include deposit facilities, foreign exchange transactions, opening of
letters of credit, and issuance of export/import licenses on behalf of the
Government. However, its main commercial banking function is extending
short-term working capital loans which it has provided to over 17,000 of its
clients. The average outstanding amount of MIB's working capital loans was
W 3.1 million ($6,500). Commercial banking operations accounted for as
much as 75 percent of MIB's gross income in 1974, and were financed entirely
from demand and time deposits, which totalled W 129.1 billion ($266 million)
as at December 31, 1974.
46. Term financing by MIB consisted exclusively of domestic currency
lending until 1964 when, following an amendment to its Act, MIIB began to
make term loans in foreign currencies. Approvals of term loans (in both
domestic and foreign currencies) have recently increased sharply, reaching
W 19.6 billion ($40 million equivalent) in 1974, - about three times the
annual level in 1971-72. By the end of 1974, over 1,500 of MIB's clients
had received term loans and over half the total amount of outstanding term
loans ($101 million) was accounted for by MIB's foreign currency lending.
47. The overwhelming proportion (89 percent) of 14IB's financing (both
long- and short-term) has gone to the manufacturing sector. Textiles
accounted for 30.5 percent of total loans outstanding as of December 31,
1974, metal products and machinery 20.5 percent, and chemicals, rubber and
plastics 10.6 percent. The average size of MIB's domestic currency long-
term loans is about W: 14 million ($29,000) and that of its foreign currency
loans about $125,000.
48. An examination of a sample of MIB's recent appraisal reports indi-
cates that they are of generally acceptable standards, especially in their
analysis ot collateral and the technical, financial and marketing aspects of
projects which are the most pertinent for small business lending. The main
wealmess in MIB's appraisal work at present is the inadequate coverage of
a project's economic benefits. Following discussions with the appraisal
mission, iIB's management intends to correct tnis deficiency through: (a)
a more systematic and extensive analysis of economic benefits (such as
value-added, net balance of payments, and employment effects), and (b)
the calculation ot the financial and economic rates of return for proj-
ects under the Bank loan requiring MIB's financing for $0.5 million or
more, as a preliminary to applying such an analysis to most of its sub-
projects.
49. The main responsibility for project follow-up rests with MIB's
local branches, except for projects financed by MIB's foreign currency loans,
the supervision of which is undertaken jointly by ELD and the branches. Its
follow-up work is generally good and contributes to the excellent quality
of its porttolio. Follow-up procedures are well thought-out, reporting
requirements are generally complied with by MIB's clients, and plant visits
by MIB's staff are frequent. The management is regularly informed of the
- 14 -
progress, status, and problems relating to projects. However, MIB's follow-
up work would be made even more effective if it had an evaluation mechanism
for determining the extent to which the financial and economic benefits
expected at the time of appraisal are actually achieved. At the Bank staff's
suggestion, MIB intends to implement an appropriate system for monitoring the
performance of sub-projects under the Bank loan.
Resource Structure
50. A noteworthy feature of MIB's resource structure is its heavy de-
pendence on deposits which, as of December 31, 1974, amounted to W 129.2 bil-
lion ($266 million ) of which W 57.8 billion ($119 million) were time depos-
its (of over one-year maturity) representing 64 percent of MIB's total long-
term won resources, and W 71.4 billion ($147 million) were demand deposits
representing 88 percent of MIB's total short-term won resources. N-IB uses
its short-term deposits for financing only short-term working capital loans,
and its long-term resources (including deposits for over one year) for
financing its term loans. In addition, MIB's deposits are subject to the
reserve requirements stipulated by the Bank of Korea from time to time (pres-
ently 17 percent for time deposits and 21 percent for demand deposits). Its
practice of matching the maturities of deposits with those of investments
made therefrom, together with the reserve requirements, ensure that NIIB's
deposits, are employed in a financially prudent manner. iIIB's long-term
won resources (other than deposits) are rather limited and amount to about
W 32 billion ($66 million) including its present equity capital 1/ and bor-
rowings from: (a) Government (W 15.5 billion, $32 million); (b) the NIF
(lW 1.5 billion, $3 million); and (c) the Industrial Rationalization Fund 2/
(lW 10.5 billion, $21.6 million).
Financial Situation
51. As of December 31, 1974, MIB's total assets amounted to 1W 213 bil-
lion ($439 million) of which the outstanding loan portfolio was W. 159 bil-
lion ($325 million) or 74 percent of total assets. Apart from an inade-
quate equity base, MIB's overall financial condition is satisfactory, and
is reflected in a portfolio of excellent quality. At the end of 1974,
arrears of principal and interest represented 3.5 percent of the total
outstanding portfolio. The debt service cover averaged about 1.4 for the
1971-74 period, with the current ratio ranging from 1.6 to 1.9. MIB's
1/ W 4.4 billion ($9.0 million).
2/ The Industrial Rationalization Fund (IRF) was set up in 1972 and is
administered by KDB. It provides finance to industries producing
essential consumer goods, intermediate products, machinery and agro-
industries. IRF has obtained its resources by borrowing from the Gov-
ernment and foreign sources, and by issuing its Industrial Finance De-
bentures.
- 15 -
profitability has been modest, averaging slightly over 7 percent of net
worth in the same period. This does not reflect inefficiency but is
largely attributable to the fact that, as a Government-owned development
institution, MIB undertakes a range of developmental functions which are
not primarily profit-oriented (its extension services, for instance, are
provided at a nominal fee and it maintains a large network of branches
and deposit offices to serve the outlying areas of the country). MIB
has not, so far, made provisions for doubtful accounts. In spite of
the good quality of the portfolio, it would be consistent with sound bank-
ing practices for MIB to make such provisions so as to enable it to write
off eventual bad debts without having to reduce its net worth. Following
discussions with the appraisal mission, MIB has indicated that it intends
to make provisions for 1975 and thereafter.
52. MIB's present under-capitalization is reflected in a high debt/
equity ratio. As of December 31, 1974, its net worth amounted to about
W 4.4 billion, (of which W 3 billion, $6.2 million, represented the paid-in
share capital, and W 1.4 billion, $2.9 million, reserves and retained earn-
ings). As of the same date, its long-term debt stood at W 113.9 billion,
$234 million, (inclusive of time deposits of W 57.8 billion, $119 million),
giving a long-term debt/equity ratio of 23.8:1. Total indebtedness (inclu-
sive of short-term liabilities and demand deposits) amounted to W 208.8
billion ($430 million), reflecting a total debt/equity ratio of 46.0:1.
The Government and MIB's management realize the need for strengthening
MIB's capital structure. MIB has agreed to maintain its long-term debt/
equity ratio at a level not exceeding 10:1 and the Government has under-
taken to provide MIB with such capital as shall be necessary to bring the
ratio within this limit by December 31, 1976 (Sections 4.05 and 4.07
of the Loan Agreement and Sections 2.02 and 2.03 of the Guarantee Agreement).
Economic Impact of N1IB's Projects
53. MIB's processing of requests for working capital loans consist
largely of an evaluation of collateral and borrowers' credit standing. As
regards equipment loans, no systematic compilation of the actual economic
performance (for instance, in terms of employment, value added and exports)
has been made for projects which have been completed. However, an analysis
of the available data on 174 projects for whiclh MIB approved foreign currency
loans in the two-year period 1973-74 *indicates that these projects have
generated a total investment of W 33.6 billion ($70 million equivalent).
Annual incremental sales attributable to these projects are estimated to
average W 70 billion ($144 million equivalent), of which 49 percent ($79.8
million) is expected to be exported. The direct additional employment gen-
erated by these projects was 22,369, at an average investment cost of W 1.5
million ($3,800 equivalent) compared with a national average investment cost
of $5,500 per employee for Korean industry as a whole.
54. An ex-ante calculation on a representative sample of 20 recently
approved projects shows that in most cases the economic rate of return was
in excess of 30 percent, and the financial rate of return above 20 percent.
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55. With a view to broadening its developmental impact in support of
general Government policies and programs, MIB has formulated a development
program for the next two years, 1976-77, which includes inter alia:
(a) increasing the proportion of its lending to areas
outside Seoul and Busan (which account for less
than 40 percent of MIB's existing portfolio) to
not less than 50 percent of its total lending
during the 1976-77 period;
(b) expanding the scope of its technical and extension
services, including in-plant consultancy services.
For this purpose, an appropriate program (agreed
by the Bank) for strengthening the staff of the
Extension Services Department for the period 1976-77
will be implemented;
(c) stepping up efforts to undertake sector studies,
feasibility and market studies on selected SMI
activities, with a view to identifying suitable
investment opportunities and/or improving the
operation of existing industries. For this
purpose, MIB's staff will be strengthened appropriately.
Business Prospects and Resource Requirements
56. MIB estimates that commitments of equipment (i.e. long-term) loans
in both domestic and foreign currencies in 1975 are expected to increase to
W 23.8 billion ($49 million) - or 22.5 percent above the actual level of W 19.6
billion ($40 million) in 1974, and thereafter by about 20 percent annually.
Its commitments of term loans for the five-year period 1975-79 would account
for 15.4 percent of total fixed investment in the SMI sector, compared with
19.0 percent in 1974. These projections of term loan commitments are based
on its assessment of resources likely to be availabLe to it. MIB should be
able to exceed its business forecast if it succeeds in raising additional
long-term resources. Various possibilities are being explored such as the
issuance of MIB bonds with an interest subsidy by the Government and in-
creased borrowings from the NIF. MIB's commitments of short-term working
capital loans are projected to increase at the same rate of about 20 percent
per year from W 610.3 billion ($1.2 billion) in 1974 to W 1,604.1 billion
($3.3 billion) in 1979. It expects to be able to raise additional deposits
and to obtain refinancing facilities from the Bank of Korea to finance its
expanding short-term operations. To meet its projected foreign exchange
commitments, MIB will need new foreign currency resources totalling $152.8
million for the four-year period 1976-79, including $62.7 million for the
two-year period 1976-77. The proposed Bank loan of $30 million would fi-
nance about one-half of MIB's foreign exchange commitments over the next
two years, 1976-77, with the balance expected to be financed by another
Asian Development Bank loan.
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Relending Terms
57. Interest rates applied by 4IB to SMI borrowers are generally the
same as those applied to larger industries by commercial banks and other
financial institutions. Its foreign currency loans have an interest rate
of 10.5-11 percent with the ultimate beneficiary bearing the exchange risk.
Local currency loans carry an interest rate of 15.5 percent but preferential
rates are granted for selected activities such as exports (9 percent) and
machinery industry (12 percent). Deposit rates range from 1.0 percent to
5.4 percent for demand deposits, and from 12.6 percent to 15.0 percent for
time deposits of between 3 and 24 months. Although not directly comparable,
public debentures yield about 21 percent per year and the average dividend
yield on common stock was 13.6 percent in 1974. The Bank has expressed its
concern that the prevailing 15.5 percent standard domestic currency lending
rate is on the low side in relation to recent inflation rates and the rate
(17-20 percent) at which financial intermediaries could mobilize private
domestic long-term funds. The Government has indicated that a serious
examination of the issue was being carried out with a view to determining
what action has to be taken and its appropriate timing. The Bank's dialogue
with the Government on this subject is continuing.
58. In view of the quality of MIB's appraisal work and the proven
ability of its management to make sound investment (lecisions, a free limit
of $0.5 million is recommended. There would be no aggregate free limit
under the proposed loan. With the proposed free limit, it is estimated
that roughly one-quarter of the number of sub-projects under this loan
(accounting for about one-half of the loan amount) would require prior
approval by the Bank.
Justification
59. The continued growth of SMI in Korea is an important element of
Korea's development strategy, especially as it relates to employment creation
in the country as a whole and the deconcentration of industry. MIB's ex-
perienced and competent staff and its relations with the Government and business
community make it a particularly suitable channel for providing finance and
technical assistance to SMI enterprises.
60. For the future, IfIB's growth is not expected to be constrained by
lack of demand for the financing and other services it offers. The main
objective of the proposed Bank loan, in addition to the provision of finance
for investment in SMI, is to assist IIIB in expanding its operations on an
economically and financially sound basis by improving its appraisal standards,
staffing pattern and financial structure. Further, IIIB's intention of
directing a greater share of its lending for the establishment and expansion
of SMI enterprises in the areas other than the Seoul and Busan industrial
complexes will help in the realization of more equitable regional distribution
of jobs and income. In sum, the proposed loan will increase the flow
of resources to SMI, contribute to greater regional dispersal of investment
and achieve important institution building objectives by strengthening
the capability of MIB to service the needs of the SIfl sector in Korea.
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PART V - LEGAL IHISTRaIENTS AND AUTHIORITY
61. The draft Loan Agreement between the Bank and Borrower, the draft
Guarantee Agreement between the Guarantor and the Bank, the Report of the
Committee provided for in Article III, Section 4 (iii) of the Articles of
Agreement and the text of a draft resolution approving the proposed loan
are being distributed to the Executive Directors separately. The Loan and
Guarantee Agreements follow the normal pattern of Bank agreements for loans
of this kind. Features of the Agreements that are of special interest are
referred to in paragraph 52 of this Report.
62. I am satisfied that the proposed loan would comply with the
Articles of Agreement of the Bank.
PART VI - RECOItIENDATION
63. I recommend that the Executive Directors approve the proposed
loan.
Robert S. HIcNamara
President
by J. Burke Knapp
Attachments
November 5, 1975
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KOREA
THE STATUS OF BANK GROUP OPERATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
A. Statement of Bank Loans and IDA Credits (as at September 30, 1975)
Loan or US$ Million
Credit Amount (less cancellations)
Number Year Borrower Purpose Bank IDA Undisbursed
Six loans and credits fully disbursed 53.8 39.7
600 1965 ADC Irrigation 645.0 4.9
151 1969 Republic of Korea Education 14.8 2.1
669 1970 Republic of Korea Railways hO.0 2.6
234 1971 Republic of Korea Livestock 7.0 0.3
769 1971 Republic of Korea Highways 54.5 1.3
283 1972 Republic of Korea Irrigation 15.0 1.D
795 1972 ADC Irrigation 33.0 30.1
335 1972 Republic of Korea Agricultural Gr. 10.5 1.5
863 1972 Republic of Korea Railways NO.0 10.8
905 1973 KDFC Dev. Fin. Co. N0.0 3.9
906 & 1973 Republic of Korea Education II 23.0 20.0 42.8
394
917 1973 Republic of Korea Ports 80.0 74.3
942 1973 Republic of Korea Seeds Production 7.0 6.6
953 197k Republic of Korea Tourism 25.0 22.8
956 1974 Republic of Korea Highways II 17.0 25.6
994 1974 AFDC Agriculture 13.0 12.8
1070 1975 Rtepublic of Korea Secondary Cities 15.0 14.9
1094 1975 Republic of Korea Program Loan 100.0 23.0
1095 1975 KDB Dev. Fin. Co. 60.0 60.o
I096 1975 Republic of Korea Third Education 22.5 22.5
1101 1975 Republic of Korea Fifth Railway 100.0 100.0
1145 1975 GDFC DFC 55.0 55.0
Total 883.8 107.0 518.8
of which has been repaid 16.4 .5
Total now outstanding 867.4 106.5
Amount sold 2.0
of which has been repaid o.8 1.2
Total now held by Bank and 866.2 106.5
IDA (prior to exchange adjustment)a
Total undisbursed 494.1 24.7 518.8
a __
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B. Statement of IFC Investments (as of September 30, 1975)
Fiscal Amount in US$ Million
Year Obligor Type of Business Loan Equity Total
1968 KDFC Development Financing - 0.7 0.7
1969 Honam Silk Co. Textiles 1.4 0.3 1.7
1970 Atlas Paper Co. Pulp and paper 4.5 0.5 5.0
1971 Korea Investment Capital market development - 0.7 0.7
and Finance Corp.
1974 KDFC Development Financing - 0.4 0.4
1974 Korea Investment Capital market development - 0.3 0.3
and Finance Corp.
1975 Gold Star & Co., Electronic Products 16.0 1.3 17.3
Ltd.
1975 Korea Securities Capital market development 5.0 0.6 5.6
Finance Corp.
1975 Tong Yang lNylon Synthetic fibers 6.9 2.1 9.0
Company Ltd. , -
1975 Hae Un Dae Tourism 2.7 0.7 3.4
Development
Company Ltd.
Total gross commitment 36.5 7.6 44.1
less cancellations, terminations,
repayments and sales 12.8 0.8 13.6
Total commitments now held by IFC 23.7 6.8 30.5
Total undisbursed 2.9 0.7 3.6
1/ Cancelled at the request of the Company
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.PROJECTS IN EXECUTION
Loan No. 600 Pyongtaek-Kumgang Irrigation Project; US$45.0 million
Loan of May 23, 1969; Closing Date: December 31, 1976
The Project includes irrigation for about 35,000 ha, improvement
of drainage and roads, consolidation of paddy fields, benching of upland
and tidal land reclamation. Construction was delayed by a reorganization
of the executing agency and a delay in hiring consultants. The major proj-
ect components (two sea dikes, the main distribution system and pumping
plants) were largely compleLed by the end of 1974. Contracts for nearly
all of the remaining work have been awarded. Cost considerations have led
to the exc'lusion of about 5,000 ha of land from the project. Costs have
risen from US$90 million at: appraisal to about US$130 million largely
because of the increased costs of right-of-way, engineering, administra-
tion and land consolidation. Preliminary estimates indicate increases in
the price of rice will partially offset the effects of higher costs and
reduced irrigable area. The economic rate of return is now estimated to
be about 10 percent, compared with the appraisal estimate of 14 percent.
The implementing agency (ADC) has reviewed ways of economizing on the
remaining work which should lead to some marginal cost savings. About
88 percent of the Loan has been disbursed. Construction is progressing
satisfactorily and is scheduled for completion by mnid-1976.
Credit No. 151 First Education Project; US$14.8 million Credit
of June 4, 1969; Closing Date: September 30, 1976
This Project comprises: (a) the expansion and equipping of 27
technical, commercial and agricultural high schools, 5 post-secondary
higher schools and 4 university teacher training departments; and (b)
26 man-years of technical assistance and 20 man-years of overseas fel-
lowships to support the development of agricultural and technical educa-
tion. All civil works, furniture, technical assistance and fellowships
included in the Project have been completed. Equipment procurement is
more than 90 percent complete and the remaining 38 items are being ten-
dered. Disbursement has now reached about 85 percent of the total. The
total project cost is estimated to remain about 3 percent below the appraised
estimate. Due to delays in final equipment procurement, the Closing
Date has been extended by nine months.
1/ These notes are designed to inform the Executive Directors regarding
the progress of projects in execution, and in particular to report
any problems which are being encountered, and the action being taken
to remedy them. They should be read in this sense, and with the
understanding that they do not purport to present a balanced evaluation
of strengths and waknesses in project execution.
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Loan No. 669 Third Railway Project; US$40.0 million loan and
Credit No. 183 US$15.0 million Credit of May 14, 1970; Closing Date:
December 31, 1976
The bulk of the Loan and Credit was earmarked for the purchase of
freight cars, diesel locomotives, and telecommunications and track mainte-
nance equipment. Progress is generally satisfactory except for delays in
the procurement of some microwave equipment which had to be re-tendered.
The Closing Date has been extended by a year to December 31, 1976 to pro-
vide adequate time for the completion of procurement.
Credit No. 234 Integrated Dairy Beef Development Project; US$7.0 million
Credit of February 11, 1971; Closing Date: March 31, 1977
The development of about 700 small and medium-sized dairy farms
by providing long-term loans and the construction and operation of two dairy
products processing plants are the principal components of the Project which
also includes the provision of management and technical services. To date,
about 580 farmers have participated and farm loans of about US$4.5 million
equivalent have been approved. About 4,900 head of cattle have been purchased
and two dairy plants have been constructed and are in operation. The proceeds
of the Credit are almost fully committed.
Loan No. 769 First Highway Project; US$54.5 million Loan of
June 29, 1971; Closing Date: December 31, 1976
The construction of approximately 370 km of national highways
between Jeonju and Busan was satisfactorily completed in December 1973, at
a final cost about five percent above the appraisal estimate. Feasibility
studies and detailed engineering have been completed for 1,400 km and 1,100
km of national highways, respectively. A study of road maintenance and the
establishment of a pilot maintenance organization formed the basis of the
creation of a country-wide Highway Maintenance Organization which is being
carried out under the Second Highway Project. The Closing Date has been
extended by 13 months to permit completion of procurement of highway main-
tenance equipment.
Loan No. 795 Yong San Gang Irrigation Project; US$33.0 million Loan
Credit No. 283 and US$15.0 million Credit of February 2, 1972; Closing
Date: September 30, 1977
This Project aims at transforming an area with the highest drought
frequency in Korea into one with reliable irrigation and crop diversifica-
tion. Also, there will be increased production of high value crops such as
fruits and winter vegetables. Design work is proceeding satisfactorily and
the work on four dams, the main canals and land consolidation has started.
Award of all major contracts have been made, although the delay on several
means that construction will begin roughly a year later than scheduled at
appraisal. The delay was caused mainly by increased costs due largely
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to price escalation and design modification. The cost increases will
be partially compensated for by benefits attributable to the enlargement
of the area to be irrigated by about 1,400 ha., and ADC plans to reduce
costs by constructing only canals, roads and drainage systems for contour
furrow irrigation on all lands exceeding 2 percent slope. Also the Bank
has begun monitoring construction costs on each of the ten major civil
works contracts on a monthly basis.
Credit No. 335 Agricultural Credit Project: US$10.5 million Credit of
September 29, 1972; Closing Date: September 1, 1976
The Credit supports a three year lending program to small farmers
to develop orchards, sericulture and mushroom production and to encourage
the breeding of poultry and swine. It also finances an organizational and
accounting study of the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF)
and the strengthening of its training facilities. The Project is progress--
ing satisfactorily and disbursement is proceeding on schedule.
Loan No. 863 Fourth Railway Project; US$40.0 million Loan of
November 22, 1972; Closing Date: December 31, 1976
The main elements of the Project are: electrification of lines
in the Seoul suburban area; purchase of electric railcars and locomotives;
the completion of electrification of 350 km of line running from Seoul to
the northeastern part of Korea; track and bridge renewal; provision of
yard facilities; acquisition of passenger and freight cars; and improve-
ment of facilities for the maintenance and repair of motive power and
rolling stock. No major problems have been encountered; nearly all of
the Loan proceeds have been committed.
Loan No. 905 Fourth KDFC Project; US$40.0 million Loan of June 13,
1973; Closing Date: December 31, 1977
The Project is progressing satisfactorily.
Loan No. 906 Second Education Project; US$23.0 million Loan and
Credit No. 394 US$20.0 million Credit of June 13, 1973;
Closing Date: December 31, 1977
The Project provides equipment for and extensions to the buildings
of: 18 technical and 14 agricultural high schools; ten higher schools/junior
colleges for industrial, agricultural, fishery and nursing training; colleges
of agriculture, engineering and natural sciences in nine universities and a
merchant marine college; and ten junior teacher colleges and 12 colleges of
education. It also includes pre-investment studies on health and manage-
ment education. Implementation is about seven months behind schedule due
to delays in the preparation of equipment lists (civil works, which are
being financed by the Government, are slightly ahead of schedule). The
Project has encountered two problems: delays in equipment procurement
and lack of counterpart funds to cover cost overruns on civil works (about
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75%). However, steps have been taken by the Government and the Bank to
overcome these problems and therefore implementation should improve within
the next six months. The Project is expected to be completed on schedule
by the end of 1977. Disbursement has been somewhat slower than expected
at appraisal due to the delay in the preparation of equipment lists but is
expected to improve.
Loan No. 917 Ports Project; US$80 million Loan of June 27, 1973;
Closing Date: June 30, 1979
The Project includes the provision of container and bulk cargo
facilities and equipment at Busan and coal piers and handling equipment at
Busan and 21ukho. Some contracts for dredging and pier construction have
been awarded. The design-work and preparation of tender documents for the
remaining items are proceeding satisfactorily. Revised cost estimates show
an increase of about 30 percent over appraisal estimates. A Phase II Port
Development Study and consultants' services in connection with the establish-
ment of a "Korean Port Authority" are proceeding satisfactorily.
Loan No. 942 Seeds Project; US$7.0 million Loan of November 16, 1973;
Closing Date: December 31, 1978
The Project consists of: (a) the installation of five field crop
seed processing and storage facilities; (b) farm machinery for seed produc-
tion; (c) procurement of seasonal seed inventories through the operation
of a revolving fund; (d) seed testing laboratories and equipment; (e) crop
research (financed in part by USAID); (f) feasibility studies for irrigation
and area development; and (g) technical assistance. The necessary legisla-
tive and administrative action for revising the Seed Law and establishing
an "Office of Seed Production and Distribution" has been taken. Project
implementation is proceeding satisfactorily. Preliminary estimates suggest
that Project costs would be somewhat higher than envisaged at appraisal; the
estimates are being reviewed.
Loan No. 953 Kyongju Tourism Project; US$25.0 million Loan of
January 4, 1974; Closing Date: December 31, 1978
The Project forms part of the first phase of the planned develop-
ment of the Bomun Lake resort near Kyongju. It provides for a multi-purpose
dam; an irrigation system for about 1,200 ha; improvement and expansion of
the water supply and sewerage and solid waste disposal systems for the city
of Kyongju and the resort area; installation of electrical supply and tele-
communication facilities for the resort area; the construction and/or re-
alignment of about 57 kms of roads; infrastructure including storm water
drainage, environmental sanitation, community facilities, a golf course,
a school for training hotel personnel; and a feasibility study for the
development of tourism on Cheju Island. Final design for almost all
Project components is complete and several contracts have been awarded.
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Loan No. 956 Second Highway Project; US$47.0 million Loan of
January 25, 1974; Closing Date: December 31, 1977
The Project, which forms part of the Government's 1972-76 road
construction and paving program, consists of the construction (chiefly on
new alignments) of about 130 kms and paving (largely on existing align-
ments) of approximately 635 km of national highways; feasibility studies
by consultants of about 1,000 kms of national and provincial roads, fol-
lowed by detailed engineering where justified; and the procurement of
highway maintenance and workshop equipment for the extension of a new
highway maintenance program from a pilot province to the remainder of
the country. All construction and paving contracts have been awarded.
Loan No. 994 Integrated Agricultural Products Processing Project;
US$13.0 million Loan of June 7, 1974; Closing Date:
June 30, 1979
The Project aims at integrating the on-farm production of com-
mercial crops for export with efficient hygienic processing facilities
using land that is presently idle or underutilized. It comprises (i)
on-farm development of asparagus, oak mushrooms and mushrooms; (ii) con-
struction of and improvements to facilities to process asparagus, oak
mushrooms, mushrooms and fruits; and (iii) technical assistance includ-
ing training of staff, services of consultants, etc. The Project is
progressing satisfactorily.
Loan No. 1070 Secondary Cities Regional Project; US$15.0 million
Loan of January 15, 1975; Closing Date: March 31, 1979
The principal aims of the Project are th,e establishment of an or-
ganizational framework for regional investment, planning and development and
to improve working and living conditions in the secondary cities of the less
developed Gwangju region. The main elements of the Project are; (i) housing
sites and services in the cities of Yeosu, Mogpo and Gwangju (370,384 m2)
(ii) a fishery harbor complex with industrial processing zone (215,385 m )
in Yeosu; (iii) a city market in Suncheon City (33,160 m2); and (iv) access
roads in Yeosu and Mogpo (6.61 km). It also provides technical assistance
to strengthen regional planning and development, to improve the utilization
of existing water supply systems in the four cities, to assist the manage-
ment and operation of the fishery complex and to carry out feasibility
studies of project proposals identified under the UNDP-financed Phase II
Regional Study. The Loan was declared effective on August 18, 1975.
Loan No. 1094 Program Loan; US$100.0 million Loan of March 31, 1975;
Closing Date: May 1, 1976
The principal aim of the Loan is to help meet the foreign exchange
requirements of the import into the Republic of Korea by the private sector
of essential capital and intermediate goods. Over 80 percent of the Loan
has been disbursed.
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Loan No. 1095 Korea Development Bank Project; US$60.0 million Loan
of March 31, 1975; Closing Date: June 30, 1979
The Project provides funds to KDB which will be used to make sub-
loans to finance direct imports for industrial sub-projects during the period
mid-1975 to mid-1977.
Loan No. 1096 Third Education Project; US$22.5 million Loan of
March 31, 1975; Closing Date: June 30, 1980
The principal aims of the Project are to assist in supplying needed
skills and to establish a framework for evaluating performance and improving
the educational system. The Project consists of: (a) construction and equip-
ment of a new technical high school; (b) equipment and extension of buildings
for three agricultural junior colleges; (c) equipment and enlargement of build-
ings for a fisheries college, three fisheries high schools, and equipment for
one merchant marine junior college; (d) construction and equipment of seven
new vocational training institutes; and (e) financing of engineering and tech-
nical services required for the preparation of future education projects.
Loan No. 1101 Fifth Railway Project; US$100.0 million Loan of
April 10, 1975; Closing Date: December 31, 1978
The Project will help the Korean National Railroad (KNR) continue
as a major carrier of freight and passengers by helping in: the upgrading,
modernization and expansion of track, rolling stock, motive power, and other
equipment; the improvement of the efficiency of operation; and its financial
recovery. The main components of the Project are: an increase in station
and line capacity and improvements in signalling; acquisition of rolling
stock, diesel and electric locomotives, spare parts and repair facilities;
track renewal and improvement; bridge strengthening; completion of electri-
fication of 71 km of industrial lines; and other miscellaneous items. The
Loan was declared effective July 15, 1975.
Loan No. 1145 Fifth Korea Development Finance Corporation Project;
US$55.0 million Loan of July 23, 1975; Closing Date:
June 30, 1980
The Loan will cover about half the KDFC's foreign exchange
requirements through the end of 1977. It will be used to finance direct
imports of machinery and equipment, and the foreign exchange component of
domestically produced capital goods and of civil works. The Loan was
declared effective on September 5, 1975.
ANNEX III
LOAN AND PROJECT SUMMARY
Medium Industry Bank
Borrower: Medium Industry Bank (MIB)
Amount: $30.0 million
Terms: The proposed loan will bear interest at 8-1/2 percent
per annum. Amortization to conform substantially
to the aggregate of the amortization schedules
applicable to the specific investment projects
financed out of the proceeds of the proposed loan.
The maximum repayment period would be 18 years,
including three years of grace. Sub-loans would be
repaid to MIB over a maximum period of 15 years,
including three years of grace.
Purpose: The proposed loan would be used to help cover the
foreign exchange requirements of industrial sub-
projects to be financed by MIB.
Estimated
Disbursement: Calendar Year US$ Million
1976 9.3
1977 18.8
1978 1.9
Appraisal Report: No. 865-KO dated November 4, 1975.
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